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Understanding the Paradoxes of Multi-
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in the European Union
•
Andrew Jordan, Harro van Asselt, Frans Berkhout, Dave
Huitema, and Tim Rayner*
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has a well-known aspiration to lead the rest of the
world in the governance of climate change. While the precise expressions and
consequences of its “lead by example” approach have been widely discussed,1
not least in the period since the 2009 Copenhagen summit,2 few doubt its de-
sire (as distinct from its ability) to function as an “international agenda setter”3
in this policy area.4 In one of the most comprehensive article-length accounts of
the evolution of EU climate policy, Miranda Schreurs and Yves Tiberghien drew
attention to the various ways in which the EU has sought to lead by example.5
Writing in the pages of this journal, they documented how it has continually
backed targets and goals that are more ambitious than those of other large emit-
ters, such as its commitment to limit warming to 2°C. Internally, it has adopted
innovative policy instruments to attain these targets, chieºy the world’s largest
greenhouse gas emissions trading system (the EU ETS), as well as a range of
other policies and measures that go signiªcantly beyond what some Member
States had adopted at the domestic level.6 Prior to the Copenhagen conference,
the EU adopted a complex package of climate and energy measures, which
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aimed, among others things, at: reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per-
cent from their 1990 levels by 2020; centralizing and toughening the ETS; and
boosting the use of renewable energy.7 Had some of the other major emitters ta-
bled similar packages at Copenhagen or at Durban in 2011, the EU would prob-
ably have adopted a 30 percent reduction target.
One of the distinctive features of Schreurs and Tiberghien’s analysis is that
it aimed to offer a comprehensive account of EU climate governance. Whereas
others focused on particular aspects of EU climate governance, such as its behav-
ior in international negotiations,8 or particular policy instruments (such as
emissions trading),9 they tried to stand back and comprehend the whole of EU
climate governance in a way that echoed some of the initial accounts of EU cli-
mate policy.10 They were brave to do this because EU policy had expanded
greatly since these ªrst accounts were made. What, they asked, accounts for
the overall pattern of governance in the EU? More speciªcally, what explains the
“sustained pattern of policy innovation” it has achieved, particularly since
the late 1990s?11 Despite some obvious “policy failures”—to which we can now
add its inability to inºuence the deal brokered in Copenhagen—how and why
does the EU continue “to be [an] international policy leader” in the area of cli-
mate change?12
These are very big questions, to which Schreurs and Tiberghien offered
one similarly all-encompassing explanation: a “dynamic process of competitive
multi-level reinforcement among the different EU political poles within a con-
text of decentralized [i.e. multi-level] governance” has continually pushed up
standards and, by implication, the EU’s role in setting them.13 This process has
emerged in the slightly paradoxical situation in which the EU seeks to lead by
example but is itself a relatively leaderless system of governance. Thus far, this
multi-level dynamic had, they contended, managed to overcome the many ob-
stacles that at one time had frustrated policy change. These included inter alia:
the multitude of actors and levels of governance; the EU’s weak legal compe-
tences over key policy areas such as energy and taxation; and the perceived eco-
nomic risks of moving quicker and further than other large emitters.14 In the
mid to late 1990s EU climate policy began to take off. Changing constellations
of national interests (speciªcally the desire of certain states to push the EU to a
higher level of ambition),15 EU-level interests (the European Commission’s de-
sire to use climate policy as a means to deepen European political integration),
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and ideas (notably in relation to green growth or ecological modernization)
were undoubtedly important enabling factors, but according to Schreurs and
Tiberghien, what really facilitated policy innovation was the EU’s relatively
open and pluralistic governance structure. This “enabled a dynamic of competi-
tive leadership reinforcement to take place,” which endured for most of the
2000s.16
This article starts from the same premise as Schreurs and Tiberghien—that
there is a lot to be gained by considering EU climate governance in the round. It
also “brackets off” international-level dynamics and inºuences and investigates
what goes on inside the EU. Although external factors are hugely important
(and are mentioned in the analysis below), sensibly Schreurs and Tiberghien
opted to lay them to one side in the interest of parsimony. However, in contrast
to their analysis, this article identiªes and explores three additional features of
climate governance. First, it extends the timeframe by looking at the full sweep
of time from the origins of the policy area in the late 1970s to the signing of the
Copenhagen Accord in late 2009. Second, it looks across the increasingly inter-
related challenges of mitigation and adaptation. And third, it extends their
thinking by distinguishing not one but ªve paradoxical features of EU climate
governance. The Oxford English dictionary deªnes a paradox as something
which is “apparently inconsistent with itself or with reason, though is in fact
true.” The rest of this paper develops the notion of paradoxical features in an at-
tempt to deepen our collective understanding of policy innovation in general
and EU climate governance in particular.
Having identiªed the main aims of this article, the remainder unfolds as
follows. Section two provides a brief re-statement of Schreurs and Tiberghien’s
arguments. Section three provides a brief description of the evolution of EU cli-
mate policy with a view to assessing how much can be accounted for in terms of
continuous “multi-level reinforcement.” Section four unpacks the ªve paradoxi-
cal features of EU climate governance and shows how they have played out in
relation to policy development since the late 1970s. Section ªve looks forward,
assessing how far they are likely to enable and/or constrain the future develop-
ment of EU policy. Finally, section six draws together some broad conclusions
and identiªes new research challenges.
EU Climate Policy: A Case of Multi-level Reinforcement?
The EU is not the only actor in international climate politics,17 but for several
reasons Schreurs and Tiberghien were right to subject it to detailed analysis.
First, the EU is interesting because it has adopted commitments that are much
more ambitious than other large parties. Although not the largest emitter of
greenhouse gases, it is nonetheless expected to have an important bearing on
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the world’s efforts to avoid dangerous climate change. Second, its efforts offer
governance theorists a range of insights into whether ambitious policies can be
produced in multi-leveled political systems. Generally, the assumption is that
the more levels (and hence veto points) there are, the more likely policies are to
be blocked or watered down, thereby resulting in what EU scholars have termed
“joint decision traps”18 culminating in “policy gridlock.”19 At present, US cli-
mate policy at the federal level appears to be snared in just such a trap,20
whereas Schreurs and Tiberghien implied that the EU has not succumbed to
this; on the contrary, its policies seem to have ºourished. Finally, scholars of do-
mestic politics in Europe are drawn to the EU because what happens at the EU
level can deeply affect national and local political life across Europe, through
processes of emulation and, above all, Europeanization.21
If there was an analytical core to Schreurs and Tiberghien’s thoughtful and
wide-ranging argument, it was that the EU’s structure—comprising nonstate ac-
tors such as the European Parliament and the Commission; the constant shar-
ing out of steering roles such as the Presidency; and numerous entry points for
nonstate actors—has more than compensated for the proliferation of potential
veto points that could in theory have gridlocked policy. In order to move be-
yond thick description, they borrowed an insight from Zito, who argued that
depending on circumstances (changing actor preferences for example), decision
points are not necessarily veto points—they can also be “leadership points.”22
Thus, in the area of climate change, different actors operating at different levels
of governance have become very adept at “passing the baton” of leadership
from one to the other.
Schreurs and Tiberghien’s analysis serves to remind us of an important
paradox that has always underlain the EU’s approach to governing lots of
things, not just climate change. While the EU, as a whole, regularly expresses a
collective desire to lead, it remains a relatively leaderless system of governance,23
without a single point of governing (or “government”). This state of affairs did
not arise by chance: by aiming for polycentric governance, the EU’s ‘founding fa-
thers’ deliberately set out to prevent power from accumulating in ways that had
dragged Europe into two world wars.24 Branches of governance theory tell us
that in such settings, leadership (as well as policy coordination more broadly) is
likely to be immensely challenging,25 although there may be associated beneªts
in terms of greater ºexibility and responsiveness.26 Be that as it may, their main
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point still stands—leadership has been bountiful despite the (paradoxical) ab-
sence of a single point of governing.
To be fair, Schreurs and Tiberghien’s basic claim is not especially novel,27
but they were the ªrst to abstract it from the general ªeld of EU analysis and ap-
ply it to the issue of climate change. They did not root it in (or seek to test) par-
ticular theories of the EU, and they did not seek to systematically compare the
level of policy innovation in the EU with that occurring in comparable multi-
level settings such as the United States. Consequently, it remains a partial ac-
count. Indeed, they concentrated on only one paradoxical feature—the plenti-
ful supply of leadership in a leaderless system of governance—when arguably
there are, as will be made clear, several more. Importantly, this one feature was
presented in a somewhat static and isolated fashion; they did not investigate the
EU’s ongoing response to them all. This omission could have arisen because
policy-makers in the EU came to realize that they did not have to directly alter
the ªrst paradoxical situation, for example by systematically centralizing leader-
ship functions.28 On the contrary, leaderlessness seemed to enable policy inno-
vation. The remainder of this article seeks to reªne and also greatly extend
Schreurs and Tiberghien’s thinking by investigating how the EU has responded
not just to the one paradoxical feature, but also to four other, interlinked fea-
tures. Rather than seeking to develop and/or test a speciªc theory of EU gover-
nance,29 the analysis proceeds at the same general level as theirs.
EU Climate Policy
A Brief Historical Overview
EU climate policy has been well over thirty years in the making. In the late
1970s, it was one small aspect of the EU’s research policy. Its aim was to investi-
gate the underlying scientiªc issues associated with climate change rather than
exploring questions relating to its governance. It was not until some eight years
later that the Commission issued a communication on climate change.30 Al-
though climate change-related policies were starting to be put in place around
this time (particularly at Member State level), their primary motivations were
environmental and energy-related, not climate change. The only other EU insti-
tution to show any interest was the European Parliament, but it was far too
weak to do any more than offer opinions. There was certainly little evidence of
“multi-level reinforcement” before 1988.
After 1988, this initial phase of agenda setting gave way to a period of
more determined policy initiation, again dominated by Member States. In
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the Council, the desire for common emission reduction policies grew, par-
ticularly amongst greener states such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Ger-
many. Although the EU played a signiªcant part in securing the adoption of
the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), its own poli-
cies remained largely symbolic in nature. So long as its “1990 by 2000” stabili-
zation target could mostly be achieved through existing (i.e. national level)
commitments, there was actually no need for EU-wide policies or burden shar-
ing agreements. As the political mood at the national level changed (essentially
favoring more national control and greater economic growth), the Commission
had to watch as the Council systematically stripped its climate proposals of sub-
stantive content after 1992. Most notably, the Council blocked its 1991 pro-
posal for an EU-wide carbon/energy tax.31 Again, “multi-level reinforcement”
fails to capture the slow and incremental manner in which EU level policies
were accumulating during this period.
That the various parts of the EU were able to summon any collective en-
thusiasm for the post-UNFCCC negotiations was largely due to the fact that
greenhouse gas emissions were declining relative to their 1990 levels, albeit for
entirely unrelated reasons (namely economic and energy market restructuring
in Germany and the UK). These trends allowed the EU to remain united in
terms of long-term goals (principally in the form of the two degree target, facili-
tated by an informal burden sharing agreement in 1996). It signed the Kyoto
Protocol as a single bloc in late 1997. Yet, this masked a great deal of internal
disagreement on many detailed matters; and crucially, Member States contin-
ued to operate on the basis of their own national targets and policies. Yet again,
multi-level reinforcement was conspicuous by its absence.
Nevertheless, the policy status quo had to change, because it was deemed
insufªcient to deliver the EU’s newly adopted Kyoto target. As part of a package
of measures to address rising emissions from the transport sector, a series of vol-
untary agreements were reached with car manufacturers. Other new EU-level
policies were also adopted, but often in areas where the reduction of green-
house gas emissions was a secondary consideration or a “co-beneªt” (e.g. the
landªlling of waste). The EU mainly concentrated on what it was best at,
namely agreeing technical standards covering traded products like washing ma-
chines and boilers. There was, in other words, a steady trend towards “multi-
level reinforcement” but it hardly amounted to signiªcant “policy innovation,”
deªned as policies that deviated signiªcantly from the status quo.
Behind the scenes, though, the Commission opened up discussions with a
wide array of stakeholders on more innovative policy options, in a forum
known as the European Climate Change Programme. This proved to be an effec-
tive incubator for many of the policy proposals that emerged in the more active
and dynamic period of EU policy-making covered by Schreurs and Tiberghien
(essentially after 2000). In this period, many more of the Commission’s propos-
als were adopted, driven along by more alarming scientiªc warnings from the
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and buoyed by a surge of public
interest and leadership from politicians at the national level (such as Tony
Blair). An important policy change around this time was the EU’s sudden volte-
face on emissions trading. This was partly driven by the perceived need to save
the Kyoto Protocol following the US’ withdrawal in 2001, and partly by the ac-
tivities of policy entrepreneurs in the Commission who were pushing hard to
extend the EU’s tool box to include market-based instruments.32 The transfor-
mation in this period was all the more remarkable because it took place against
the backdrop of the EU’s largest ever enlargement in 2004, when it absorbed ten
new and relatively poor states from Central and Eastern Europe, and a renewed
focus on economic renewal, powerfully set out in the 2000 Lisbon Strategy.33
Leading on climate change also happened to ªt nicely with the EU’s wider geo-
political strategy, formalized in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, of developing a
more coherent foreign policy to project its “normative power” globally. It also
allowed politicians in the EU to differentiate their position from the more uni-
lateralist position adopted by the Bush administration.34 In all these respects,
climate policy started to emerge as a handy political rationale for people like
the Commission President Barroso to push for deeper European integration, es-
pecially after the demise, in 2005, of the EU’s previous plan—a single European
constitution.35
Therefore, after twenty years of slow growth, EU climate policy eventually
began to reinforce itself in the multi-level manner described by Schreurs and
Tiberghien. After 2005, the EU focused its energies on complying with the
Kyoto Protocol (lest failure undermine its claims to lead), developing internal
policies for the period after 2012, and preparing the ground for what it hoped
would be a successor agreement. The key internal policy development in this
period was the adoption of the climate and energy package noted above. This
highly complex combination of policies aimed to reduce emissions by 20 per-
cent and boost the share of renewable energy to 20 percent by 2020.36 However,
as EU leaders stepped up their rhetorical commitment to climate policy, so the
political limits to continual multi-level reinforcement started to appear. For ex-
ample, after the start of the global ªnancial crisis in 2007 (which, incidentally,
was when Schreurs and Tiberghien’s analysis ended), extensive concessions had
to be made, for example to secure the support of poorer EU states. In the run up
to Copenhagen, while the more eager states pushed for an even higher (30 per-
cent) target linked to offers of fast track ªnancial assistance to induce develop-
ing country support, the poorer states adopted a more cautious line. According
to some observers, Copenhagen marked a political “watershed”37 in the EU’s ap-
petite for, and ability to adopt, ever stronger and more innovative climate poli-
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cies tied to a 30 percent emissions reduction target. In the run up to the 2011
meeting in Durban, the EU adopted a somewhat tougher stance: it would only
commit to a second commitment period (and thus more than a 20 percent
reduction) under the Kyoto Protocol if all countries adopted a roadmap and
timetable for a legally binding agreement that would include mitigation com-
mitments for all major economies.38
Emerging Patterns of Climate Governance
In comparison with the more straightforwardly environmental areas of EU pol-
icy,39 such as water, waste or biodiversity, climate policy has therefore emerged
in a much slower and more stepwise fashion than implied by Schreurs and
Tiberghien. Indeed for very long periods of time, EU climate policy remained
little more than an empty shell—some eye-catching common targets under-
pinned by a rough amalgam of national policies. From about 2000, things did,
however, change relatively quickly as multi-level reinforcement kicked in. In
2008, the European Environment Agency estimated that around 80 percent of
the climate policies and measures implemented at Member State level were ei-
ther introduced in response to EU policies or had been reinforced by them.40
But prior to 2000, it is wrong to argue that there was a gradual, inexorable prog-
ress towards increasingly strong policies at EU level.
In addition to policy development being more stepwise than Schreurs and
Tiberghien originally suggested, EU climate policy is also much more variegated
than the term “multi-level reinforcement” would seem to allow for. It is
variegated in the sense that it is heavily reliant on a small sub-set of policy in-
strument types (see Table 1). There has certainly been no steady accumulation
(“reinforcement”) of all the types at EU level. In terms of the number of instru-
ments used by type, the EU steadfastly remains a “regulatory state.”41
And although one single market-based instrument (emissions trading)
now encompasses over 50 percent of total EU carbon dioxide emissions, even
this comprises hierarchical elements. Moreover, most of the EU’s regulatory in-
struments govern a relatively small subset of activities (i.e. the trade in energy-
using products such as cars and white goods). For various reasons, voluntary
agreements remain relatively under-utilized,42 while the Commission’s one and
only attempt to adopt EU-level taxes ran into concerted opposition. Thus, this
“liberal” system of governance is left in the paradoxical situation of having to
rely heavily on the “illiberal instrument” of regulation.43
If one turns to look at policy on adaptation to the effects of climate
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change—an aspect neglected by Schreurs and Tiberghien—there are still no ded-
icated measures with legislative force at EU level.44 Attempts to locate and ex-
ploit synergies between mitigation and adaptation policies are still few and far
between, even at the national level.45 In short, there seems very little prospect of
adaptation policy reinforcing in a multi-leveled manner.
Multi-level Governing: From Paradox to Paradoxes
So while the term “multi-level reinforcement” seems to have a general applica-
bility, it does not account for the totality of EU governing. Some aspects (such as
the ability to set targets and adopt certain kinds of regulatory instruments) have
steadily accumulated at EU level, but others (for example, the ability to repre-
sent Member States in international discussions, to select from the full reper-
toire of policy instruments, or shape European adaptation policies) have not.
Moreover, the quest for leadership in a governance system that is leader-
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Table 1
EU Climate Policy: Principal Policy Instruments 1992–2009a
Regulatory
instruments
1992 Monitoring CO2 emissions
2001 Electricity from renewable energy sources
2002 Energy performance of buildings
2003 Biofuels for transport
2004 Promotion of combined heat and power
2005 Ecodesign of energy using products
2006 Energy end use efªciency and energy services
2009 Climate and energy package (covering: effort sharing; emissions
trading; renewable energy; carbon capture and storage).
2009 CO2 emissions from cars
Market-based
instruments
2003 Upper and lower limit for national fuel taxes
2003 Emissions trading (amended in 2004 and 2009)
Informational
instruments
1992 Energy labeling of appliances ( daughter directives)
1992 Eco-label
1993 Eco-management and Audit Scheme
Voluntary
instruments
1998/1999 Car emissions (supplanted by 2009 Regulation—
see above)
a. Based on Jordan 2011, 2012.
less is only one of a number of paradoxical features of governing in the EU. On
the basis of the foregoing discussion, there appear to be at least four others:
• External “actorness” and internal diversity. Although the EU seeks to partici-
pate and remain fully united in international level discussions, it con-
stantly struggles to act in a united manner because Member States persis-
tently value their sovereign independence, particularly when important
governing choices have to be made and the stakes in international negoti-
ations are high.46
• Policy harmonization and differentiated burden sharing. While it is true that
different parts of the EU have pursued an increasingly common policy ap-
proach both externally (i.e. collective targets) and internally (common,
EU-level policies), it routinely falls back on differentiated forms of inter-
nal governance, typiªed by the practice of internal “burden-sharing.”
• Ambitious targets but constrained policy instrument choices. Although the EU
has adopted relatively ambitious policy targets, it relies heavily on a nar-
row sub-set of policy modes and instruments (chieºy regulation) to
achieve them.47
• Escalating ambition but constrained implementation capacities. The EU exhib-
its a well-known mismatch between ambitious policy intentions and weak
implementing capacities.48
The next section investigates how the EU has responded to all ªve para-
doxes, both singly and in combination, starting with the one originally identi-
ªed by Schreurs and Tiberghien.
The Paradoxes of Multi-level Governing
Leadership and Leaderlessness
In the EU, leadership has two sides.49 On the one hand, some actors (principally
the Commission, the Parliament and the greener states) have tried to shape
common EU-level policies by taking the lead. On the other hand, the EU as a
whole has a long-standing ambition to play a leading role as a “global actor” in
international politics.50 Yet, without a central point of steering—both inward
and outward—leadership has had to originate from many places to avoid
the kind of “policy gridlock” that is such a feature of US climate policy.51 In the
ªrst few phases of policy development, there were not enough leaders and too
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many laggards and EU policy struggled to advance, as evidenced by the failed
carbon/energy tax proposal. But as domestic preferences in some Member States
changed and the Commission as a whole started to view climate change in
more positive terms, new leaders came to the fore.
The key analytical issue at stake here is not why these preferences
changed,52 but how they fed through key decision points and affected EU-level
policies—i.e., how the absence of a single point of central leadership became an
enabling rather than constraining factor. The answer lies in the fact that institu-
tional structures that concentrate leadership are more prone to the vicissitudes
of the issue-attention cycle.53 By contrast, when there are many actors working at
many different levels, there is more likely to be a coalition with sufªcient moti-
vation (and opportunities) to drive the rest towards a higher level of ambition.
The potentially liberating effect of distributed or polycentric governance is
a signiªcant feature of Schreurs and Tiberghien’s argument.54 For instance, the
emergence of emissions trading at the international and national (the UK and
Denmark) levels has inºuenced the development of the EU system.55 Overall,
this particular feature has not been nearly as constraining as some versions of
governance theory would lead us to expect. For at least ten years, polycentricism
has, as predicted by Ostrom,56 facilitated an escalation in policy ambition, even
if the resulting policy outputs have been more variegated than Schreurs and
Tiberghien originally claimed. For their argument to have general validity, there
must have been “baton passing” not just in relation to overall targets, but also in
particular sub-areas of policy and in terms of speciªc policy instruments.
Clearly, this is inconsistent with the empirical record outlined above.
External “Actorness” and Internal Diversity
The EU tries very hard to be an internally united “actor” in its dealings with
other actors.57 Finding and holding to common positions gives it a sense of pur-
pose and, it believes, greater negotiating power, which in turn feeds through to
more purposeful internal policy development. But during the early phases of
climate policy it struggled to achieve this, spending a great deal of time “negoti-
ating with itself.”58 One of the main reasons for this was that Member States
were strongly of the view that they should determine the pace of internal policy
development and that consequently climate change should remain an issue of
“mixed competence.” In other words, they have never been willing to vest the
Commission with the power to negotiate on their behalf in international dis-
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cussions, and thus make the EU more “actor-like.” As such, there has been no
systematic multi-level reinforcement in the EU’s external negotiating powers.
There is of course an important downside to this, which is that it leaves the
EU at risk of dissolving into competing factions when the political heat is on,
potentially imperiling the course of an entire international negotiation. In spite
of all the various changes that have been made to reinforce the EU’s actorness,
the risk of internal division remains ever-present. Shortly after Copenhagen,
Connie Hedegaard, who presided over that meeting before becoming the EU’s
ªrst Climate Change Commissioner, claimed that:
[i]n the last hours, China, India, Russia, the US and Japan each spoke with
one voice while Europe spoke with many different voices. . . . Sometimes
we’re almost unable to negotiate because we spend so much time talking to
each other.59
The institutions of the EU have, however, taken a series of incremental
steps to address this particular feature. The political shock of the failed Confer-
ence of the Parties at The Hague in 2000 (when large Member States openly
worked against one another) forced them all to seek much greater actorness; the
Commission was thus formally brought into the “troika” arrangement (in
which the Presidency of the Council works closely with the previous and future
incumbents of that position). After 2004, further adjustments were made to cre-
ate a system of “issue leaders” and “lead negotiators” through which national
and Commission ofªcials work together in mixed teams.60 Further changes are
being made in the wake of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty.61 However, the Commis-
sion’s attempts to represent the EU at all international meetings have been con-
tinually blocked by states.
To conclude, the EU as a whole has taken active steps to address this par-
ticular paradoxical feature. These have had to be carefully (re)negotiated be-
cause they impinge on the states’ sovereign power to negotiate independently in
international affairs.62 But in doing so, the EU as a whole has realized that while
actorness is politically challenging to attain, the beneªts of internal diversity are
not overwhelming either. To understand this, one need only look at a fully-
ºedged federation such as the US, in which the federal government (i.e. the
functional equivalent of the EU) deªnes the national “common” position, with-
out having to negotiate so intensively with lower levels. Common positions
(“actorness”) take time to reach in the EU, but when the EU eventually signs
an international agreement, it delivers 27 signatures and—thus far in climate
policy—an equivalent number of ratiªcations. By contrast, the US must still
overcome the ratiªcation hurdle, as witnessed by the US administration’s con-
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tinuing failure to secure the Congress’ support for the Kyoto Protocol. In other
words, “the very characteristic that makes the EU so problematic for traditional
global negotiations—an uncertain, or mixed identity—becomes a strength
when it comes to the ratiªcation and implementation stages.”63
Policy Harmonization and Differentiated Burden Sharing
The third paradox is strongly related to the previous one. The EU’s overriding
mission is to secure trade liberalization, which in part it does by promoting pol-
icy harmonization. One could even decode its preferred approach to interna-
tional climate governance (binding “targets and timetables”) as a partially suc-
cessful attempt to “upload” this approach to the UN level.64 But having fought
for such an approach at the international level as well as special provisions for
the EU to participate in UN treaties, the EU has continually adopted internal
burden sharing agreements whereby each Member State is allocated a slightly
different target. This is about something entirely different: differentiated gover-
nance.65
Critics maintain that burden sharing is a rather hypocritical and self-in-
dulgent exercise in internal governance, which has had to be painstakingly em-
bedded in the legal architecture of the UNFCCC. But once a burden sharing
agreement has been struck, it has arguably held the EU together more tightly
than would otherwise have been the case, preventing long and potentially debil-
itating prisoners’ dilemmas.66 Moreover, by acting together, Member States have
arguably increased their bargaining power in international discussions. As
noted above, the internal and external dimensions are in a sense two sides of
one coin.
To conclude, the EU has perceived this paradox to be potentially con-
straining of policy innovation and thus has sought to confront it. For example,
it has revised the internal arrangements used to share the burden of collective
emissions targets amongst Member States (whose number has grown from 9 in
1980 to 27 from 2005). Indeed, recent policies (e.g. the 2009 Renewable Energy
Directive) go one step further in this respect by enshrining national-level targets
to support a common EU-wide policy. Moreover, as more emissions are brought
within the ambit of the ETS, the whole approach to burden (or “effort” as
the Commission now prefers to term it) sharing,67 will gradually become more
market-oriented and less open to interstate bargaining.
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Ambitious Targets but Constrained Instrument Choices
Schreurs and Tiberghien documented the EU’s proven ability to adopt eye-
catching targets,68 but they overlooked the fact that its choice amongst the main
policy instruments has always been rather more constrained than at the na-
tional level. Given their inability to raise and spend large amounts of new
money, EU climate policy-makers have instead learned to rely on regulation in
order to govern, the costs of which are borne by Member States and private ac-
tors. However, policy theory69 reminds us that regulatory instruments tend to
generate beneªts that are diffuse but costs that are concentrated on particular
actors; in other words, precisely the conditions in which target groups are likely
to mobilize against policy-making.
The EU has recognized and actively tried to confront this paradoxical fea-
ture by moving beyond regulation. There have, as we have noted, been some
well-known failures (taxation for example, where the EU still cannot agree upon
minimum levels of taxation for energy-saving products), but also some unex-
pected successes: the EU ETS represents a clear case of rapid policy innovation.
Adaptation too is slowly emerging as a test-bed for softer, non-regulatory forms
of governance such as policy mainstreaming.70 But in other respects, this para-
doxical feature has turned out to be not quite as constraining as was originally
feared. Unlike states (which are often tied up in the highly divisive politics of
raising and spending public money), the reliance on regulation has arguably
encouraged the EU to concentrate on what it does best—governing techno-
cratically through a myriad of humdrum regulatory decisions. Some claim it has
even given the EU a basic “clarity of purpose,”71 which has been highly liberat-
ing when problems are, like climate change, extremely complicated.72
Escalating Ambition and Constrained Delivery Mechanisms
The ªfth paradoxical feature relates to the perceived mismatch between ambi-
tion and reality. The EU’s inability to turn “lofty” ambitions into concrete
change was not lost on Schreurs and Tiberghien,73 but its long-term importance
was rather glossed over. Problematic implementation is not simply an internal
matter: critics seize on it to cast doubt on the EU’s sincerity and capability as a
credible negotiating partner. Until now, though, the EU has evaded the poten-
tially constraining effect of this feature by adopting targets that were either ef-
fectively self-implementing or could be achieved at relatively low economic
cost. Thus, it easily met its initial stabilization target (emissions in fact fell
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3.5 percent).74 The indications are that it will fulªll its Kyoto target (see below),
but again only by relying heavily on “gratis” reductions made by the largest
states,75 or via the ºexibility mechanisms that it ªercely resisted when the US
government initially proposed them in the UNFCCC process.
Nonetheless, the failure in the past to achieve more speciªc targets in rela-
tion to the use of renewable energy sources or energy efªciency indicates the
presence of underlying implementation problems that will not easily go away.
To the extent that the issue has been confronted, it has been in a rather round-
about manner: the EU meets its policy targets but for reasons that are not di-
rectly to do with its policies.
Multi-level Governing: Looking to the Future
Immediate Challenges
Looking forward, there are a number of immediate challenges, which could well
provide a much sterner test of the EU’s ability to govern in a multi-reinforcing
manner.76 In the short term, the most obvious (but easiest) challenge will be
to ensure that it fulªlls its Kyoto commitments. Until quite recently, there
were grave fears that it would not. These were addressed by the wave of new pol-
icies that appeared post-2000. Any remaining doubts have again been greatly al-
layed by “non-policy” effects including the global recession and higher energy
prices.77
The second immediate challenge—delivering the 20 percent target by
2020—was also thought to present a serious test of the EU’s governing ambi-
tions. However, the European Environment Agency’s most recent estimates sug-
gested that the EU-27 is making such good progress that it may eventually reach
the target with several years to spare.78 Nonetheless, the EU remains very wary of
proceeding to a unilateral cut of 30 percent. One reason is to secure bargaining
power in international discussions (as occurred at Durban), but another is to
ensure that escalating policy ambition is not undermined by constrained imple-
mentation (the ªfth paradoxical feature). Some Member States are already well
on the way to meeting such a target and are keen to take the risk, but others are
not, lest it put their industries at greater risk of carbon leakage.79 More internal
debates in relation to the simultaneous desire for policy harmonization and dif-
ferentiated burden sharing (the third paradoxical feature) can thus be expected
in the period to 2020.
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Aside from the risk of carbon leakage, interim targets beyond 2020 (but
prior to 2050) are proving challenging to agree within Europe because the asso-
ciated reductions will have to be made in areas that hitherto have been relatively
untouched by EU policy, particularly transport, which remains the fastest grow-
ing source of greenhouse gas emissions, and agriculture.80 These two policy ar-
eas go to the very heart of the European integration project. Agriculture is one of
the oldest areas of EU policy-making and has generally been resistant to radical
reform. And as an inherently trade liberalizing institution concerned with facili-
tating the mobility of people and goods, the EU has found it very hard to atten-
uate the rising demand for travel. In the meantime, much will depend on a sin-
gle policy instrument—the EU ETS—and the dampening effect of the recession.
Although the EU ETS has generated some emission reductions (the exact ªgures
are contested),81 it will need to do a great deal more to decarbonize the EU.
Then, of course, there is adaptation.82 Much rests on how well the EU can
negotiate its way to a post-2013 budget that re-allocates resources away from in-
vestments and spending—particularly in agriculture and regional infrastructure—
that increase vulnerability, towards new patterns that reduce it. Here, the poli-
tics are not as immediately amenable to the multi-level reinforcement dynamics
described by Schreurs and Tiberghien. While the Commission, supported by the
Parliament, may wish to see a progressive “greening” of the structural funds, this
will require the agreement of a Council in which new Member States, keen to
follow traditional patterns of development, are strongly represented (note the
presence of the third paradoxical feature). The fourth paradoxical feature, re-
lated to policy instruments, could also play out rather differently in the area of
adaptation, which comprises a much more local set of issues that are unlikely
to be amenable to the “one size ªts all” regulatory approach followed for
mitigation.
At the same time as it is grappling with these internal challenges, the EU
will have to engage with the international community across a wide array of re-
lated issues. When the EU’s climate policies were still in their infancy, the Com-
mission had to devote more of its energies to engendering multi-level reinforce-
ment. After Copenhagen, it has to ªnd new ways to confront the second
paradoxical feature (actorness-diversity), in order to foster more developing
country support. Developing countries have made it abundantly clear since Co-
penhagen that they will only accept limitations on their emissions and systems
of monitoring and veriªcation if richer countries provide new and additional
sources of ªnance. It is by no means clear where all this money will come from,
particularly when the Eurozone is experiencing its worst ever recession and the
richer states (especially Germany) are very reluctant to open up the vexed issue
of internal ªnancial burden sharing (thus extending the third paradoxical fea-
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ture). Although the US administration’s struggles to upgrade its domestic cli-
mate governance system could open up a leadership opportunity for the EU to
exploit, it may just as easily be seized by rapidly emerging economies like
China, Brazil and India, who seem to prefer a more open “pledge and review”
type approach. In order to realize its leadership ambitions the EU may be forced
to return again and again to the second paradoxical feature—the combination
of external actorness and internal diversity—until, perhaps, the Commission is
made the sole negotiator, as it is in international trade negotiations.
Longer-term Challenges
In addition, there are challenges not just of a longer term but possibly also more
existential nature. At present, EU policy is very heavily focused on mitigation,
powerfully expressed by its almost totemic 2°C target. After 2000, the nexus be-
tween mitigation and energy security emerged as a powerful facilitator of multi-
level reinforcement, culminating in the climate and energy package. By contrast,
the Member States’ adaptation policies are still relatively inchoate and, lacking
an equivalent driver, the EU’s is barely even in existence. Therefore, the EU
needs to decide what its mid- to long-term focus is going to be. From a scientiªc
perspective, the advice is by no means clear. The 2°C target is not only seen as
being more difªcult to achieve, especially after the Copenhagen conference,83
but also increasingly as insufªcient to fulªll the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective—
that of preventing “dangerous” climate change.84 Were it to be attempted, accel-
erated mitigation ambitions would also likely run up against the ªfth paradoxi-
cal feature—constrained implementation. In this situation, calls have grown for
policies that not only aim to mitigate for at least 2°C but also enable adaptation
to potentially much greater rates of warming such as 3 or even 4°C.85
The intense scientiªc debates around these issues have not yet led to simi-
larly intense discussions of the implications for governance. The implications of
shifting the emphasis from mitigation to adaptation are potentially very chal-
lenging because the 2°C target has: provided a framing of the problem that di-
verse leaders have found acceptable (a means of handling the ªrst paradox);
provided the EU with an important ‘identity’ in global negotiations (related to
the second paradox); and has implicitly been regarded as broadly achievable
with the existing forms of burden sharing (paradox three). Signiªcantly, it has
also provided a signal to investors (and third countries) that the EU is strongly
committed to mitigation. But preparing for a world that is more than 2°C
warmer is likely to require a much greater focus on adaptation, not just in Eu-
rope but internationally. In turn, this will alter the way in which the paradoxical
features appear. For example, which actors will lead the EU in such a world (the
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ªrst paradoxical feature)? Vulnerable regions and sectors within and outside Eu-
rope will almost inevitably demand ªnancial transfers to cope with the pre-
dicted impacts, raising the issue of adaptation burden sharing (i.e. a profound
change in the third paradoxical feature). Moreover, producing stronger adapta-
tion policies which do not undermine those addressing mitigation is unlikely to
be straightforward either, requiring not simply policy innovation but something
more difªcult still—multi-level policy coordination.86 In principle it should be
possible to promote synergies—or at least avoid conºicts—between mitigation
and adaptation policies.87 But if the stalled adoption of the Soils Directive is
anything to go by, these may be more difªcult to secure agreement on than
when climate policy was much more mitigation focused.
This takes us to the second existential challenge, which is how to ensure
that the EU itself remains democratically robust enough to address any changes
in the paradoxical features. In recent years, the EU’s mitigation policies bene-
ªtted as much as other policy areas from the permissive social consensus in fa-
vor of deeper European integration. In a political world short of “Europe-wide
policy discourses,”88 climate change presented the EU with a golden opportu-
nity to demonstrate its political relevance by generating more and more policy
outputs. As has so often been the case, politicians relied strongly on generating
policy outputs to secure the EU’s legitimacy, and rather neglected the input side
of politics: public participation, deliberation and open contestation. It is strik-
ing that many of the key decisions on issues like burden sharing and standards
for traded products were made in highly technocratic fora such as the EU’s laby-
rinthine comitology committees. However, the permissive consensus has been
badly dented in recent years by a series of referendum defeats, declining turn-
outs in European elections and the rise of anti-EU parties in various Member
States. This has turned it into something different—a “constraining dissensus.”89
Where this leaves EU climate policy is far from clear. As the impacts of cli-
mate change become more pronounced and the ªnancial cost of mitigation and
adaptation stack up, the politics of governing show every sign of becoming
more, not less difªcult: the old canards (produce more policy by engaging in
“multi-level reinforcement”) no longer seem as uniformly relevant. If, for exam-
ple, the EU moves from 20 percent to a 30 percent target and then, as envisaged,
onto something like an 80 percent reduction by 2050, will European citizens re-
ally be as ready to accept “Brussels” intruding into their everyday choices? Will
national politicians be as willing to pool parliamentary sovereignty on such a
strategically important issue in the EU? Either way, national governments may
ªnd that they have to work a lot harder to carry their citizens along with them.
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Conclusion
EU climate policy has emerged as an important focus of research amongst EU
scholars as well as those seeking to understand climate governance. Although
the early literature took a holistic approach, many of the more recent contri-
butions have adopted a more disaggregated focus. We are indebted to Schreurs
and Tiberghien for trying to arrange these snapshots into a broader picture.
Their concept of “multi-level reinforcement” does help to make sense of the
whole. However, their analysis suffers from some important shortcomings. First
of all, it relies on a picture of EU policy that is empirically incomplete (i.e. miss-
ing the period prior to the 1990s). As a consequence, it presents the develop-
ment of climate policy in rather too linear a manner, whereas others have em-
phasized the slower and more circuitous nature of policy development,
especially in the longue durée from the late 1970s through to circa 2000.90 It also
overlooks the lopsided nature of EU climate policy, particularly the heavy em-
phasis on mitigation as opposed to adaptation, and fails to account for the con-
tinuing reliance on a small sub-set of policy instruments. Consequently, one is
left wondering whether “multi-level reinforcement” is likely to persist, or was
only a feature of one particularly dynamic but ultimately short-lived era of gov-
erning in the EU.91 There is plenty of scope for fresh theoretically informed work
on policy innovation that compares the EU with other multi-leveled/polycentric
governance systems.
This article has sought to maintain the same broad level focus as theirs. In
doing so, a series of paradoxical features were identiªed and explored. They pro-
vide an important part of a wider explanation for the EU’s behavior at the inter-
national level—i.e., the kinds of policies, targets and instruments it pushes for
and the way it conducts itself in international negotiations. Crucially, these will
help to shape the opportunities for and the obstacles to sustained policy inno-
vation (“leadership”) in the future. Key actors (principally states) will doubtless
continue to confront the tensions that arise from the simultaneous desire for
greater international actorness and internal diversity—the second paradoxical
feature. The Lisbon Treaty introduced another set of institutional changes that
once again confronted this tension,92 including a new diplomatic service that
pools the resources of the Council and the Commission, but the debate is far
from resolved. Either way, having a strongly coordinated position is important,
but only if other negotiating parties are willing to engage with it. At Copenha-
gen, they were not.
Meanwhile, the EU continues to deal with the tension between its desire
for policy harmonization and differentiated burden sharing—the third para-
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doxical feature. With the steady expansion and tightening of the EU ETS, the
EU’s governance of burden sharing is expected to move in a more market-ori-
ented direction. Nonetheless, there are other looming challenges, namely adap-
tation burden sharing, which the EU has barely started to discuss, let alone ac-
tively confront.
With respect to the fourth feature—the desire for ambitious targets but a
constrained set of policy instrument choices—the EU has exploited opportuni-
ties to move beyond traditional regulation—the emissions trading system being
a case in point. Regulatory approaches have undoubtedly served the EU well in
the last years, but policy theory tells us that they have a tendency to generate
concentrated costs and diffuse beneªts. Whether and for how long the EU can
continue to rely so heavily on regulation to govern climate change, remains a
very moot point.
Finally, until now, the EU has confronted the tension between high policy
ambition and constrained implementation mechanisms—the ªfth paradoxical
feature—very indirectly by relying heavily on non-policy effects. In time, it may
be forced to confront it more directly, for example by building in stronger im-
plementation powers to ensure the policy innovations deliver the outcomes ex-
pected of them.
To conclude, Schreurs and Tiberghien have successfully demonstrated that
there is a lot to be gained by investigating EU climate governance in broad
terms. If there is one thing that such a perspective reveals, it is how much reli-
ance has been placed on tweaking the existing governance system in order to ex-
ploit the more positive aspects of its paradoxical features. Time after time, more
radical changes proved rather unnecessary, because some of the features en-
abled as well as constrained multi-level reinforcement. Should we therefore de-
clare EU’s approach to governing a success? In terms of setting ambitious targets
and adopting common policies and measures, the answer is probably yes. But if
we examine policy outcomes—i.e. what governance has actually delivered in
terms of emissions reduced and adaptations secured—the overall verdict has to
be less positive, although the counterfactual can never be fully known.93 If gov-
erning is really about the active steering of society, then the most charitable thing
that can be deduced is that the EU has successfully established a highly sophisti-
cated governance framework, whose effectiveness has not yet been systemati-
cally tested.
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